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Abstract
It is scientifically and technically possible to build an earth penetrating
device that could bury a B61-7 warhead 30 meters into concrete, or 150
meters into earth, before detonating it. The device (based on knowledge
and technology that are available since 50 years) would however be large
and cumbersome. Better penetrator materials, components able to withstand
larger stresses, higher impact velocities, and/or high-explosive driven pene-
tration aids, can only marginally improve the device. It is concluded that the
robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) program may be as much motivated
by the development of new technology directly applicable to next generation
nuclear weapons, and by the political necessity to periodically reassess the
role and utility of nuclear weapons, than by the perceived military need for
a weapon able to destroy deeply buried targets.
∗Funding for a nuclear “bunker-buster” warhead has been dropped from the U.S. Energy
Department’s 2006 budget, according to information released on October 25, 2005. However, like
other major political issues, the project of earth penetrating warheads is a recurring subject, which
has to be assessed in the context of an evolving technological and strategic environment, that is
becoming particularly complex because of the advent of fourth-generation nuclear weapons and
new nuclear-weapon States.
1
1 Introduction
Nuclear weapons are the most destructive instruments of war available to the mil-
itary. Their destructiveness is due to a number of effects — mechanical, thermal,
and radiological — but by far the most important military effect of present-day
nuclear weapons is due to the enormous shock-waves generated in the surrounding
materials by the energy released from nuclear fission and thermonuclear fusion
within the warhead.
In an atmospheric explosion the shock-waves generated in air propagate over
large distances, destroying every building and laying down every tree within about
3 km from the point of explosion of a 1 Megaton1 thermonuclear weapon. It is this
air-blast shock-loading effect combined with the incendiary effect of high-yield
thermonuclear explosion which is at the origin of the strategy of war deterrence
by mutually assured destruction.
However, if instead of striking relatively weak structures such as buildings the
air-blast strikes the ground, most of the energy in the shock-waves is reflected
so that very little energy is in fact transferred to the ground. This very poor
“coupling” of the energy released by an atmospheric explosion is due to the factor
of about 1,000 difference in densities between the air and the soil, so that because of
energy and momentum conservation the maximum energy coupling to the ground
is at most of 15% [1, p.195]. More precisely, in the case of low-altitude near-
surface explosions (which maximize the energy transfer to the ground) the typical
theoretical energy couplings are between 5 to 10% for chemical explosions, and
about 8% for nuclear explosions — provided the direct coupling of X-rays (about
6%) is added to the mechanical coupling (about 2%) [3, p.874].2
Consequently, if the objective of a weapon is to destroy underground targets
by means of shock-waves, the obvious idea is to detonated it under the surface of
the ground. This enables a reduction by a factor of about 10 to 15 in the explosive
yield of the weapon. Indeed, even for a rather shallow burial (about 0.6 meter), the
maximum energy coupled to the ground by a 0.5 kt fission-explosion was computed
to be already about 30% of the total yield, an estimate that was confirmed by a
nuclear test conducted at the Nevada Test Site [4, p.899]. Therefore, nearly 100%
coupling is achieved when a warhead is detonated at a few meters below the
1We use italics when tons, kt, or Mt refer to tons of TNT equivalent.
2In principle one has to include the energy of the neutrons escaping from the warhead. This
contribution to the coupling is negligible for first and second generation nuclear weapons. However,
for pure-fusion third and fourth generation nuclear weapons, energy transfer by neutrons becomes
predominant. For such weapons the coupling to the ground or a target can therefore be large, even
if the weapons do not penetrate into them [2].
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Figure 1: A number of components and a partially disassembled B61 bomb are
shown in front of a fully assembled weapon (rear). The cylinder with a rounded
head on the left, located in the center subassembly of the B61, is the “physics
package” containing the actual thermonuclear warhead.
ground, so that the explosion of an earth penetrating warhead (EPW) with a yield
of about 0.5 Mt can in principle have the same destructive power as a 5 Mt above
ground detonation.
The military rationale for developing and producing the B61-11 (that is the
11th modified version of the B61 gravity bomb whose development started in
1961) was therefore to provide a replacement for the 9 Megatons B53 that was
intended to be used for destroying buried command centers and other underground
targets. Moreover, since the precision and the flexibility of the delivery of the B61
were substantially greater than those of the B53, it was felt that these advantages
would more than compensate for the lower yield of the B61, which is at most of
340 kt.
The B61-11 began entering service in 1997. It was therefore the first “new”
nuclear weapon to enter into the arsenal of a declared nuclear power after the
conclusion (in 1996) of the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
during which the United States stated that the B61-11 would be the last weapon to
enter into its nuclear arsenal. So why is it that the United States’s administration
is now seeking a lifting of the 1993 ban on development of new nuclear weapons
(the Spratt-Furse Law)? On 9 May 2003 a committee of the United States Senate
passed a bill to that effect, calling for the development of a “bunker buster” bomb
to be called the robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP).
Part of the reasons are of a military-technical nature: Even though the B61-
11 can bury itself 3–6 meters underground before detonation, it cannot destroy
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targets at depths or distances much larger than 30–100 meters below or away from
the point of explosion. This is because shock-waves propagating through a solid
medium are much less destructive that those propagating through air [5, Chap.6].
For instance, ordinary buildings and even much stronger structures such as bridges
or above-ground military constructions are relatively brittle: The interaction of the
blast-wave from an atmospheric explosion with them will be essentially inelastic,
resulting in their complete failure at relatively large distances.
On the other hand, the interaction of an underground shock wave with a tunnel
or a buried bunker will be elastic over a considerable range of overpressure, with
the result that well-designed man-made structures will not fail unless the materials
themselves fail. For example, the assured destruction range of a shallow-buried
explosion of 1 Mt is on the order 150–250 m. This corresponds to the onset of
gross rock failures for most formations and thus represents the range of survival
for the best examples of underground construction [1, p.200]. Assuming a scaling
with the third root of the yield, this confirms the stated maximum destruction range
of the B61-11, i.e., about 100 meters. However, this maximum destruction range
does not take into account the protection measures that can be taken in order to
improve the resistance of underground structures to the adverse effect of shock-
waves. These include many techniques such as decoupling by means of spaced
or multilayered walls made of materials of different densities; shock absorption,
reflection or diffusion; shock mounts for fragile equipments; etc. As a result,
one can easily estimate that the stated lower destruction range of 30 m is truly a
minimum, even for a 340 kt explosion, because some carefully designed structures
may survive even that close to the point of the explosion.3
It is therefore possible, on the basis of these purely technical facts, and without
addressing the related military and political implications, to argue that a warhead
that would be able to bury deeper into the ground before exploding would be more
effective to destroy underground targets. However, even with perfect accuracy in
weapon delivery, this ability to explode at a greater depth will only get the point
of explosion closer to the target — It will not be able to extend the lethality range
of the weapon itself. For example, if the minimum assured lethality range of the
B61-11 is 30–100 m, the corresponding range for a RNEP version able to bury
30 m deeper into the ground [6, 7, 8, 9] will be 60–130 m. Therefore, contrary to
certain claims, it seems impossible that a RNEP based on the B61-11 could crush
targets 300 m underground. This is because extending the penetration range of
the B61-11 by a factor of 5–10, that is from 3–6 m to about 15–30 m in reinforced
concrete or solid rock, is already a considerable technical challenge, as will be
3Assuming a third root scaling, a factor of 3 in distance corresponds to a damping by a factor
of about 30, which is not very difficult to achieve with proper civil engineering.
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seen.4
The paper is organized as follows:
In the Sec. 2 we review the physics of the penetration of a strong and rigid
projectile into a compressible solid target in order to find out whether there is
room for improvement in comparison to what is known to be possible with existing
materials and techniques. After deriving from first principles the rather simple
expression giving the maximum hypothetical penetration depth as a function of the
key physical parameters, Eq. (12), it is found by comparisons with a dozen different
penetration experiments (in which a variety of projectile and target materials are
used) that there is very little room for improvement: not more than 30 to 60%.
Starting form Sec. 3 we specialize to a concrete target, for which Eq. (17)
gives a good estimate of the penetration depth as a function of the length, effective
density, and velocity of the penetrator. It is found that the stated penetration
capability of the B61-11 is consistent with its published physical mensurations
and weights.
In Sec. 4 we give the physical and engineering reasons explaining the B61-7
impact resistance (the B61-7 is the warhead of which the B61-11 is a ruggedized
earth-penetrating version), which enables it to withstand the considerable decel-
eration upon impact with the ground. We also derive simple formulas giving
estimates for the maximum and mean decelerations during penetration.
In Sec. 5 we assess the scientific feasibility of a RNEP able to bury the
B61-7 warhead 30 meters into concrete, or 100 to 150 meters into earth. Four
general possibilities are analyzed: (i) maximizing the weight and length of the
penetrator; (ii) maximizing the velocity of the penetrator; (iii) using conventional
penetration aids such as a precursor shaped-charge jet; and (iv), assuming that
radically new types of compact nuclear explosives will become available in the
next few decades, speculations are made on hypothetical new designs which could
provide a technically more attractive solution than the three previous possibilities.
In Sec. 6 we briefly recall the environmental and political limitations to the use
of nuclear weapons, even when detonated underground. In particular, we stress
the political and nuclear proliferation problems posed by the “plutonium mines”
created when an underground plutonium bomb explosion is contained.
In the last section, Sec. 7, we conclude that the technology for building a
4In this paper we consider only the mechanical effects of nuclear weapons on buried targets.
The use of penetrating nuclear weapons against targets containing chemical or biological agents
has been the subject of a number of reports, which are generally skeptical on the effectiveness of
this type of engagement. See, e.g., [10].
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working but cumbersome penetrator suitable to bury the B61-7 warhead 30 meters
into concrete is available, but that improving that penetrator and trying to reduce
its size and/or weight by a factor of two will be very difficult, even if considerable
advances are made in the realms of materials science, micro-electromechanical
systems’s engineering, and nanotechnology. Finally, considering these difficulties,
as well as the military and political limitations to the battle-field use of existing
types of nuclear weapons, we wonder whether apart from keeping the nuclear
weapons debate alive, an important reason for considering a new generation of
nuclear earth penetrating weapons would not be to develop their associated non-
nuclear technologies, which overlap with those required for radically new types of
weapons, both conventional and nuclear [2].
2 Fundamental physical limits to kinetic penetration
A recurring suggestion in the general scientific literature is that by some new
“trick” the penetration depth of a kinetic penetrator could be substantially increased
(perhaps by a factor of ten or more) over what is presently possible with available
materials and technologies, e.g., [9]. In order to show that this is not possible, we
will study a simple model in which everything is idealized except for the most basic
processes which enable a high-velocity object to penetrate into a material such as
steel, concrete, or earth. Moreover, the model will be such that all approximations
tend to overestimate the penetration depth, what is for instance the case for a
one-dimensional model in comparison to a two- or three-dimensional one.
For this model we follow the general idea suggested in Ref. [11], namely that
when a high-velocity projectile penetrates into a material it creates a shock wave
which compresses and heats the material ahead of it: The maximum penetration
depth is then obtained when the material immediately ahead of the projectile (i.e.,
sufficiently heated to evaporate) is instantaneously removed by some ideal process,
so that the penetrator can continue its course until its kinetic energy is exhausted,
or some fundamental limit is reached. In other words, the basic idea is that the
kinetic energy of the penetrator is entirely used to melt the material ahead of it,
and that all other processes which remove that material are supposed to have no
energy cost. Similarly, it is supposed that the frictional forces on all sides of the
penetrator are negligible, and that all flows of materials in the regions adjacent to
the surface of the penetrator are completely free. However, whereas the velocity
is supposed to be high, it is not supposed to be so high that one is in the high-
velocity hydrodynamic-limit where all materials (including the penetrator which
in the present model is supposed to be perfectly strong and rigid) behave as ideal
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incompressible-liquids, and all the kinetic energy is used to move them aside from
the path of the penetrator.
Let us therefore take a penetrator of length L, frontal area S, density ρp,
and very high compressive strength Yp; and a semi-infinite target of density ρt
and compressive strength Yt.5 To begin with we suppose that this penetrator is
incompressible and sufficiently strong to remains intact during penetration into
the target.6 According to our model, at any given time during penetration, the
velocity of the projectile vp(t) is such that the compressive strength of the target
is exceeded, so that ahead of it the target material is compressed by a shock-wave
to a density ρs > ρt. As we are considering large penetration velocities, we can
assume the strong shock limit, in which case
ρs = ρt
1 + γ
1− γ , (1)
where γ > 1 is the polytrope exponent.
The crucial step in the reasoning is now to apply energy-momentum con-
servation to the shocked target material ahead of the penetrator, which implies
d(ρsSxvs) = ρsS(x dvs + vs dx) = 0, (2)
where x is the distance measured (for convenience) from the back of the penetrator
and vs(x, t) the velocity of the shocked material at any given time. With the
boundary condition vs(L, t) = vp(t), this equation is trivially integrated, i.e.,
vs(x, t) = vp
L
x
, (3)
One can therefore calculate the energy distribution in the shocked material
Es(x, t) =
∫ x
L
1
2
Sρsv
2
s dx = Ep
ρs
ρp
(1− L
x
), (4)
where Ep(t) = 12Sρpv
2
p(t) is the kinetic energy of the penetrator at time t. By
derivating this equation and dividing by S, or by directly using (3), one can also
calculate the energy density, i.e.,
dEs
dV
(x, t) =
1
2
ρsv
2
s =
1
2
ρsv
2
p
L2
x2
. (5)
5To be precise, what matters most in the present problem is not the “bulk compression modulus”
K , but the “unconstrained (or unconfined) compressive strength.” For metallic projectiles and
cohesive targets it has a magnitude comparable to the yield strength Ys, which is typically in
the range of 10 Mpa to 2 GPa. For cohesionless or granular targets such as soil or sand, the
unconstrained compressive strength in on the order of 0.1 to 10 MPa.
6That restriction will be removed at the end of this sections, when the maximum impact velocity
consistent with our model will be evaluated.
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The last equation can now be used to write down the criterion for penetration,
which is simply the condition that the energy density in front of the penetrator has
to be higher than that corresponding to the compressive strength of the target, i.e.,
dEs
dV
(x, t) =
1
2
ρsv
2
p
L2
x2
≥ Yt. (6)
In particular, the minimum velocity7 of the projectile for penetration to proceed
until it has come to a rest is given when x = L, i.e.,
vp,min =
√
2Yt
ρs
. (7)
Equation (6) can also be used to calculate the thickness ∆z = x − L of the
shocked region such that its energy density exceeds Yt, i.e.,
∆z + L = L
√
ρs
2Yt
. (8)
In the present model, the energy ∆E = Es(∆z + L, t) given by Eq. (4) corre-
sponds to the energy used to “evaporate” the material in the region of thickness
∆z ahead of the penetrator. Therefore, since that material is supposed to be in-
stantaneously removed out of its way, the penetrator’s linear energy loss is given
in first approximation by
dEp
dz
≈ −∆E
∆z
= −Ep
L
ρs
ρp
√
2Yt
ρs
1
vp
, (9)
or, expressing vp in terms of Ep and rearranging, by
dEp
2
√
Ep
= −
√
S
L
ρt
ρp
Yt dz, (10)
where, because the removed material is in gaseous form, we have approximate
its adiabatic exponent by that of a monoatomic gas, i.e., γ = 5/3, so that Eq. (1)
gives ρs = 4ρt.
Equation (10) is easily integrated by quadrature, giving the penetration depth
D = z in function of the initial and final penetrator energies
D =
√
L
S
ρp
ρt
1
Yt
(√
Ep(0)−
√
Ep(1)
)
, (11)
7This velocity is not the same as the usual estimate for penetration to occur, which is derived
from the ratio of the projectile ram pressure 1
2
ρpv
2
p
to the target compressive strength, i.e., Eq. (7)
with ρs replaced by ρp.
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or in function of the initial and final penetrator velocities
D = L
ρp
ρt
√
ρt
2Yt
(
vp(0)− vp(1)
)
, (12)
where the final velocity vp(1) can been replaced by the velocity given by Eq. (7),
i.e., assuming again γ = 5/3,
vp(1) =
√
Yt
2ρt
. (13)
The main result of our model, equation (12),8 is remarkable because it ex-
plains essentially all the important qualitative features observed in penetration
experiments: direct proportionality to the length, density, and velocity of the pen-
etrator; inverse proportionality to the square root of the density and to that of the
compressive strength of the target; and existence of a minimum velocity.
On the other hand, when making quantitative comparisons with the data, it
turns out — as expected form the discussion in the introduction to this section
— that Eq. (12) tends to overestimate the penetration depth. This can be seen,
for example, if one looks at the penetration depth versus striking velocity of
steel projectiles into concrete data of Ref. [12] shown in Fig. 2 of Ref. [13]. In
that case Eq. (12) overestimates D by a factor of ≈ 2.8. But, if one makes the
comparison with the data of Ref. [14] shown in Fig. 7 of Ref. [15], the discrepancy
is only a factor of ≈ 1.5 (see, Table 1). Consequently, although the details of the
experimental conditions and the exact properties of the materials used are not well
known, the “hypothetical maximum room for improvement” suggested by these
comparisons is small: at most between a factor 1.5 and 3. To better understand
what this means in practice, further comparisons with other experiments using
other target and projectile materials are made in Table 1.
Let us define the hypothetical room for improvement by the ratio R between
the hypothetical maximum penetration given by Eq. (12) and the corresponding
measurement for a given penetrator length L at a normalized penetrator velocity
of vp(0) = 1 km/s, i.e., R = (D/L)hyp/(D/L)exp at that velocity. For the sake
of comparison, and in order to exhibit some possible trends, the data in Table 1
is listed in approximately increasing order of R, except for the last experiment in
which the target is a low density foam.
The first set of data, from Refs. [14, 16, 17, 12], is for steel (i.e., ρp =
7.9 Mg/m3) ordnance-type projectiles into concrete targets. As can be seen, this
8While dimensional analysis directly leads to its general form, and many papers use it in a form
or another, I have not found a published derivation from first principles of this equation.
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Comparison of ideal maximum penetration formula, Eq. (12), to data
ρt Yt D/L d/l vf D/L R
[kg/m3 [MPa] (exp) [s/km] [km/s] (12)
Concrete [14] 2310 34.7 12 20 0.09 18 1.5
Concrete [16] 2300 62.8 6.1 15 0.11 13 2.1
Concrete [17] 2340 96.7 3.7 12 0.14 10 2.7
Concrete [12] 2500 50 5 16 0.10 14 2.8
Steel [18] 7900 1000 1 3.8 0.25 2.8 2.8
Titanium [18] 4500 800 1.2 5.5 0.30 3.9 3.2
Lexan [18] 1210 60 10 40 0.16 34 3.4
Aluminum [18] 2700 100 4 21 0.14 18 4.5
Grout [16] 2000 21.6 7.6 27 0.07 25 3.3
Grout [16] 2000 13.5 8.1 34 0.06 32 4.0
Lead [11] 11300 17 2.5 3 0.03 13 5.2
Foam [11] 110 20 120 120 0.30 85 0.7
Table 1: Ratio R = (D/L)hyp/(D/L)exp normalized to an impact velocity of
vp = 1 km/s, where (D/L)hyp = d/l(vp − vf) is calculated with Eq. (12), and
(D/L)exp is measured for the materials listed in column 1 to 4. The symbol d/l is
the slope coefficient, and vf the final penetrator velocity given by Eq. (13).
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set corresponds to the smallest room for improvement, possibly because everything
feasible has already been done with them in order to facilitate penetration, e.g.,
maximal hardness, ogival nose shape, and large length over diameter ratio (“long
rod” penetrators).
The second set of data, from Ref. [18], is for tungsten carbide (i.e., ρp =
15 Mg/m3) spherical balls into various typical armor materials: rolled homo-
geneous armor (RHA) steel, titanium, polycarbonate (G.E. Lexan), and 1100-F
aluminum. As can be seen R is comprised between 2.8 and 4.5, with a slight trend
towards an increase when going from harder to softer materials. Compared to the
previous set of data, R is about 1.6 times larger on average. However, if instead
of being spherical the penetrator’s shape would have been optimized, and thus its
drag coefficient minimized, R could have been significantly smaller. This effect
is well known and accounts for a factor of about 2 when going from a flat to a
conical shape (see, e.g., [13, p.6]).9
The third set of data consists of experiments with ogive-nose steel projectiles
impacting grout with two different compressive strengths [16]. The trend for an
increase of R when going from harder to softer materials is observed again.
The last set of data, from Fig. 116 of Ref. [11], is for spherical balls of
steel into a soft and heavy material (lead), or a low density foam (assumed to
be polyethylene). In the case of lead the hypothetical room for improvement is
5.2, suggesting that for this material the idealizations leading to Eq. (12) are not
adequate: in particular, the compressive strength is so small that little energy is
needed to crush it, while significant energy is needed to sweep it aside. Finally,
in the case of the low-density foam, the material can no more be considered as
a “solid,” even at the relatively high impact velocities considered here: Eq. (12)
fails and another model should be developed.10
Consequently, by taking into consideration the most obvious detrimental effects
that were neglected in the derivation of Eq. (12) (such as the energy needed to
moved the target material out of the way, and the influence of the penetrators’s nose
shape) the data in Table 1 show that instead of a room for improvement of about
3 to 4 as suggested by a naive interpretation, the actual margin cannot be much
more than a factor of about 1.5, or possibly even less considering the complexity
and number of small effects that should be considered at the detailed level.
9This effect remains significative in the 1 to 2 km/s velocity range where going from a flat to a
sharp nose accounts for a factor 1.4 in penetration depth [19].
10Although R ≈ 0.7 is not a bad theoretical estimate, the large value of vmin, especially in
comparison to that of lead, suggests that a different model is definitely required. In effect, vmin is
the minimum velocity for compressive-yielding to be the dominant penetration mechanism, while
for a soft material penetration occurs at a much lower velocity.
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In particular, this implies that processes such as cavitation, which can have a
significant impact in aerodynamics and low-velocity hydrodynamics [20], will not
be able to play any significant role in improving penetration into a solid target [9],
except possibly when driving into soil or mud. Similarly, using for the penetrator
a composite or nano-engineered material instead of steel [21], or a heavy-material
like uranium (which by adiabatic shearing enables to improve long-rod penetration
into a metal11 by about 10% at high-velocities [19, 22]), will only have a marginal
effect on penetration depth apart from that due to their densities.
Before summarizing, let us recall that the purpose of our model was not to
provide an exact fit to the data, but rather to give an estimate for a hypothetical
maximum penetration depth assuming that all the kinetic energy of a perfectly
hard projectile is used to “punch” a hole through the target, i.e., that none of that
energy is used to remove the material evaporated at the head of the penetrator,
and that none of that energy is lost as mechanical energy or stored as elastic
energy, but rather converted to heat in order to vaporize the material ahead of the
penetrator. This means that no conceivable physical process can possibly beat the
maximum penetration given by Eq. (12). Moreover, if the projectile itself cannot
be considered as perfectly hard, Eq. (12) will provide an even larger upper limit
to the actual maximum penetration depth. This happens when the velocity of the
projectile vp is so large that the ram pressure exceeds its compressive strength
Yp, and that it begins to erode and loose rigidity. An estimate for that maximum
velocity is provided by going to the projectile rest frame, where the ram pressure
is 1
2
ρtv
2
p , giving the expression
vp,max ≈
√
2Yp
ρt
. (14)
Then, inserting Eq. (14) in Eq. (12), we can derive a simple formula for the
maximum possible penetration at maximum projectile velocity
Dmax ≈ L
ρp
ρt
(√Yp
Yt
− 1
2
)
, (15)
which like Eq. (12) will of course overestimate the actual maximum possible
penetration depth.12
In conclusion, even if for some improbable reason the maximum penetration
depths could be larger than given by Eqs. (12) or (15) — say by a factor of two
11But not into concrete or rock.
12For the steel into concrete data of Ref. [12] one finds that (D/L)max ≈ 5, while Eq. (15) gives
about 11, i.e., a factor of 2.4 more, as could be expected from the value of R given in Table 1.
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or three — the maximum hypothetically possible penetration depth would still
not be larger than the experimentally measured and theoretically known values by
one order of magnitude.13 Therefore, any conceivable improvement in projectile
technology cannot increase penetration by a factor of be more than about 1.5.
Finally, for the penetration depth into a solid to be maximum, the projectile ve-
locity has to be comprised between the two values approximately given by Eqs. (7)
and (14). Below vp,min penetration is not possible, and above vp,max penetration
will decrease because of projectile erosion until reaching the hydrodynamic limit,
given by the well known formula
Dhydro = L
√
ρp
ρt
, (16)
which always gives a smaller penetration depth than Eq. (12), even when modified
to take compressibility effects into account, e.g., [23, 24].
3 The penetration capability of the B61-11
The present earth penetrating version of the B61, i.e., the B61-11, has a length
L = 3.7 m, and a maximum diameter d = 0.33 m. Its total weight is M ≈ 550 kg,
about 200 kg more than the B61-7, the model of which the B61-11 is a modified
earth-penetrating version. Further characteristics of the B61-7 and B61-11 are
listed in Table 2, and additional information can be found in references [25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30].
Assuming that the overall shape of the B61-11 can be approximated by an
ovoid, its volume will be V ≈ (π/6)d2L = 0.21 m3, which means that the
effective density of the B61-11 is ρeff = M/V ≈ 2.6 Mg/m3 — about three times
less than if it was made out of solid steel.
Let us suppose that the target material consists of concrete, for which we take
the characteristics listed in the third line of Table 1. For the sake of the argument, let
us also suppose that Eq. (12), which gives the hypothetical maximum penetration
depth, is overestimating the actual penetration depth by a factor of ≈ 3, i.e., the
average value of R listed in the last column of Table 1. Taking this factor into
13The only debatable parameter in Eq. (12) is the polytrope exponent γ implicitly introduced
through Eq. (1). If a reasonable value different from 5/3 is taken for this parameter, the depths
given by Eqs. (12) or (15) will be at most different by a factor of two. This has, however, no
influence on what is physically possible in order to improve penetration.
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Figure 2: A stack of two B61-4 bombs. The panels at the rear correspond to
a training kit showing the main subassemblies of the weapon and some of their
maintainable internal components. The second panel from the left shows the
“Center Bomb Subassembly” which houses the nuclear package. It is shown to be
traversed by a removable axial “rod” which corresponds to the deuterium-tritium
boost gas reservoir for the primary and the secondary stages of the thermonuclear
warhead.
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account, we therefore get the following expression
D ≈ 5Lρeff
ρFe
(vp[km/s]− 0.1), (17)
which agrees well with the data and the two empirical formulas given in Ref. [13]
when ρeff = ρFe.
In Eq. (17) the penetrator’s material enters by only one of its physical properties:
the effective density ρeff. This is an elementary but important point which, by going
through the physical reasoning leading to Eq. (12), comes from the fact that for a
perfectly hard and strong projectile the only thing that matters for penetration is
its total kinetic energy.
Another trivial but important feature of Eq. (17) is that it contains the product
of ρeff by L, a quantity called “opacity” that appears in many physical problems.
Consequently the penetration is the same if the density of a projectile is doubled at
the same time as its length is halfed, provided the penetration is measured from the
surface of the target to the tip of the penetrator when it comes to a rest. This implies
that is not necessary to know how the mass is distributed within the penetrator. For
example, in the case of the B61-11, one can suppose that its 550 kg are uniformly
distributed over its 3.7 m of length, or else concentrated in the first half (which is
actually not far from being the case, as can be seen in Table 2) and assume that its
length is only 1.85 m.
The notion that the effective opacity ρeffL is the decisive14 projectile-dependent
parameter defining its penetration capability implies that knowledge of the con-
struction details of the B61-11, or any future RNEP, is not necessary. For example,
looking at the numbers in Table 2, we see that out of the 203 kg mass difference
between the B61-7 and B6-11, 133 kg are in the front. To account for this differ-
ence several hypothesis can be made. For example, if we approximate the nose
by a cone with base diameter d, and assume that its made out of steel with density
7.9 Mg/m3, it would weight 146 kg. On the other hand, if we approximate the
new penetration aid subassembly by a cylinder of diameter d, and assume that its
made out of a tungsten or depleted uranium alloy of density 18 Mg/m3, it would
weight 153 kg. After properly adjusting the numbers, either option would lead
to the same effective opacity, and thus the same penetration. However, for many
reasons, such as flight stability and terminal guidance, neither of these options will
be optimum.
Let us now consider the penetration capability of the B61-11. If it is dropped
from a height of h = 12, 500 m, as in typical drop tests [13], its maximum ground
14As we have seen in the previous section, once obvious steps such as optimizing the penetrator’s
shape have be taken, very little room is left for improvement.
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Comparison of B61-7 and B61-11 weights and lengths
B61-7 B61-11 B61-7 B61-11
Subassembly Mass Mass Length Length
[kg] [kg] [m] [m]
Nose 0.65 0.65
Center 1.15 1.15
Penetration aid 0.10
Nose + center + penetrator 243 377 1.80 1.90
Preflight controller 23 23 0.30 0.30
Tail 80 150 1.50 1.50
Total 346 549 3.60 3.70
Table 2: The weights are from Ref. [30, Table 3.2], and the lengths are estimated
from Ref. [26, p.166] and [30]. The maximum diameter of both bombs is≈ 0.33m.
impact velocity neglecting air drag would be
vp(0) =
√
2gh ≈ 500 m/s, (18)
where g is the acceleration of Earth’s gravity.
Consequently, at a terminal velocity of 0.5 km/s, Eq. (17) gives a penetration
into concrete of 2.4 m, i.e., D/L ≈ 0.65,15 in agreement with the advertised
capability of the B61-11.
How could this penetration capability be increased? Obviously, one could
increase the impact velocity by fitting the bomb with a rocket engine, and possibly
reach the maximum set by the strength of the bomb casing, i.e., Eq. (15) where
one has to divided by 3 to be consistent with Eq. (17). For example, if the
bomb’s casing is made out of steel so that Yp ≈ 1 GPa,16 that maximum would be
D ≈ 4.2Lρeff/ρFe, i.e., approximately 5 m in concrete — quite far away from the
goal of 30 m penetration in concrete or hard rock mentioned for the RNEP in the
general scientific literature [7, 8, 9].
15This implies that the warhead should be in the front-half of the bomb, which is actually the
case since it is located in the center subassembly, see Table 2.
16In the case of maraging steel one could have Yp ≈ 2.6 GPa.
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Figure 3: Main nuclear components of an early version of the B61 [31]: the
fission primary (spherical and hemispherical parts), the fusion-fission secondary
(cylindrical parts), and the two ends of the radiation case. The primary has a
levitated pit: the small sphere at the bottom center with a hole for the deuterium-
tritium boost gas supply.
4 The robustness of the B61-11
Before discussing a number of possible designs which could lead to greater pene-
tration depths, it is useful to make a few comments based on elementary physical
considerations, which explain how the B61-7 warhead contained in the B61-11
can withstand the enormous deceleration of impact and penetration. This is par-
ticularly important since any possible future RNEP will most probably also use
this warhead, because in the absence of nuclear tests an entirely new fission-fusion
warhead cannot easily be developed, and would not have the same deterrence value
as a fully tested warhead.
In order to have a quantitative characterization of the robustness of the B61-7,
it is necessary to find an estimate of the magnitude of deceleration during impact.
A first approximation to this is obtained by assuming that after free-fall from a
height h a perfectly strong penetrator of mass m and length L is decelerated by a
constant acceleration amean. The equationmDamean = mhg gives then the estimate
amean ≈
h
D
g. (19)
For h = 12, 500 m and D = 2 m this gives a mean deceleration amean ≈ 6, 000 g.
Is it possible that a nuclear warhead can withstand such a large mean acceler-
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ation? The answer is certainly yes since earth penetrating warheads and nuclear
artillery shells have been designed and deployed in the 1950s already. This gives
an opportunity to make an estimate for the maximum acceleration during impact,
and to compare that estimate with what is known about the robustness of nuclear
artillery shells.
Suppose therefore that the ram pressure of a projectile striking a target (both
assumed to be perfectly strong) is p = 1
2
ρpv
2
p , and that the pressure at impact can
be written as p = mamax/S where S is the projectile’s cross-sectional area. In the
case of an artillery shell elementary ballistic physics shows that the projectile’s
velocity is related to the maximum range by the relation v2p = grmax. Thus
amax ≈
rmax
2L
g, (20)
where L is now the length of the shell assumed to be a cylinder. If we take for
example the W82 warhead, i.e., the “neutron bomb” artillery shell, L = 0.87 m
and rmax ≈ 30 km, giving a maximum acceleration amax ≈ 17, 000 g at impact.
In fact, by time symmetry, the argument leading to that estimate can be reversed
and interpreted as the maximum acceleration during launching of the shell by an
artillery gun, which in the case of the W82 is known to be 15,000 g [32].17 Our
estimate is therefore reasonable.
How can a nuclear warhead survive an acceleration or deceleration on the order
of 15,000 g? Clearly, the warhead should contain a minimum of moving parts
and all components must be mounted securely to resist shocks. Therefore all free
spaces have to be filled by a strong light-weight material such as polyurethane
or beryllium, of such a density that it is compatible with the functioning of the
warhead. Moreover, since the crushing pressures are longitudinal, the warhead’s
design should if possible be cylindrical rather than spherical. Finally, if the
warhead is enclosed in a heavy penetrator, shock absorbers can be used to decouple
it form the penetrator, and thus to reduce the stresses.
For example, the early version of the B61 shown in Fig. 3 has a levitated
fissile pit that must be precisely positioned at the center of the reflector and high-
explosive shells surrounding it. Because of the relatively high densities of uranium
or plutonium, such a design cannot resist very large shocks, which is why most
versions of the B61 are “lay-down bombs,” i.e., bombs that are slowed-down by a
parachute and ment to explode once they are at rest on the ground.
One the other hand, the W48 artillery shell developed between 1957 and
1963 shown in Fig. 4 is based on a hybrid gun-assembly/implosion design with
17
“The W82 warhead for the 155-mm nuclear projectile (...) must survive a 15,000g acceleration
at launching” [32].
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Figure 4: Schematic of a W48 nuclear artillery shell [33]. A critical mass is
obtained by first gun-assembling two U-235 components and then imploding them
radially. Because the overcriticality achievable is limited the yield is “very small,”
probably 0.1 kt [25].
a diameter of less than 15 cm. This cylindrical design, code-named “Manticore”
in Ref. [34], was first tested in 1955 and opened the way to the development of
cylindrical primaries for two-stage thermonuclear weapons. It is therefore most
probable that cylindrical primaries are used in the warheads of the W82 and B61-7,
and therefore in the B61-11. A French experiment related to such primaries is
shown in Fig. 5.
5 Scientific feasibility of a RNEP
The robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) program is an engineering feasibility
study under way since May 2003 in the United States, with the objective to
determine if a more effective earth penetrating weapon could be designed using
major components of existing nuclear weapons. This is a quite ambitious objective
because the engineering aspects of the problem are very complex.
In this section we focus on a less difficult objective, i.e., to determine if it
is scientifically possible to envisage a RNEP capable of penetrating 30 m of
concrete [7, 8, 9].18 Specifically we will consider four possibilities, and discuss
them in order of increasing sophistication, which in the medium to long term may
correspond to increasing order of plausibility.
18This would correspond to about 100 to 150 m of earth.
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Figure 5: Flash X-ray radiography of the implosion of a thin cylinder by confined
high-explosives [35]. The broken lines indicate the initial shape of the cylinder.
A considerable advantage of cylindrical primaries is that a sealed deuterium-
tritium boost gas reservoir can be inserted and removed axially for safety and
maintenance.
5.1 Maximization of effective opacity
According to Eq. (17), the most simple approach to increasing penetration is to
maximize the effective opacity because when dropped from a given height the
terminal velocity does not depend on the penetrator’s mass or size (as recalled by
Eq. (18)). This approach was actually taken in 1991 at the end of the Gulf war to
destroy a well-protected bunker north of Baghdad after repeated directed hits.
In that case an earth penetrating bomb, named GBU-28, was hastly created
using a 3.9 m-long, 36 cm-diameter, surplus Army eight-inch-bore gun tube filled
with high-explosives [36, 37]. By taking densities of 7.9 and 1.9 g/cm3 for the
steel and the high-explosives, respectively, the weight of the GBU-28 comes out
to be about 2,300 kg, and its effective density approximately 6,000 kg/m3. For
a length of 3.9 m and a terminal velocity of 0.5 km/s the penetration in concrete
given by Eq. (17) is 5.9 m, in good agreement with the improved version, GBU-
28/BLU-113, which is claimed to “break through 7 meters of concrete or 30 meters
of earth” [9].
Moreover, the same approach was already taken in the 1950s for designing
earth-penetrating nuclear weapons [29]. For instance, “the uranium gun-type
Mark 8 bomb (nicknamed ‘Elsie’ for LC, or light case) was almost 3 meter long,
36 cm in diameter, 1,500 kg, and had a yield of approximately 25 kt. (...) The
Mark 11 was an improved version of the Mark 8, slightly heavier, and according to
the National Atomic Museum, ‘able to penetrate up to 6.6 m of reinforced concrete,
27 m of hard sand, 36 m of clay, or 13 cm of armor plate,’19 and fuzed to detonate
19There could be an error with the armor plate thickness, which should be more like 38 cm (i.e.,
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90–120 seconds after penetration” [29]. In other words, the characteristics of
these 1950s-bombs are very similar to those of the GBU-28, except for the nuclear
warhead.
Using the same method one can easily propose a design for a weapon able
to break through 30 meters of concrete, i.e., five times more. First, one can
replace the steel tube by one made out of a strong tungsten or uranium alloy with
densities of ≈ 17 g/cm3 and get this way an effective density possibly as large
as 15,000 kg/m3. (For this purpose a tungsten heavy alloy will most probably be
preferred because it has similar density and yield strength, but a three times larger
elastic modulus E = 360 GPa, than the best uranium alloy [39, 40].) Second, in
order to get the desired factor of five increase in effective opacity, one can double
the length of the penetrator so that L = 7.8 m, and the total weight becomes
2, 300× 5 = 11, 500 kg.
Will such a design work? Most probably yes, provided the 8-meter-long, 10-
ton-heavy penetrator can be delivered and properly guided to the target, which
seems possible since its aspect ratio of 7.8/0.36 ≈ 22 is similar to that of modern
kinetic-energy antitank penetrators [40]. But what about the deceleration on
impact — will it differ from that of B61-11 for which Eq. (19) gave an average
value of 6,000 g assuming a penetration D = 2 m? As a matter of fact, no: for
a penetration of 30 m Eq. (20) actually gives a mean deceleration of only 400 g.
Indeed, the maximum impact pressure, which can be estimated by Eq. (19), does
not depend on the penetration depth or the penetrator’s weight, only on its lengthL
so that the mean deceleration is smaller for a greater penetration depth. Moreover,
by going to the penetrator’s rest-frame, one sees that the target is always impacting
the penetrator with the ram pressure p = 1/2ρtv2p , which does not depend on any
of the penetrator’s characteristics except velocity. Thus, a warhead that survived
penetration after free-fall from a given height, will also work for a heavier and
longer penetrator able to penetrate deeper into the ground after falling from the
same height.
In summary, by simply increasing the effective opacity of the penetrator one
can — in principle — achieve any desired penetration, and the existing B61-
7 warhead can be used as the explosive charge with only minor modifications.
However, the actual delivery, guidance, and successful penetration of the resulting
very-heavy and very-long penetrator will pose considerable engineering problems,
which are out of the scope of the present paper.
15 rather than 5 inches).
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5.2 Maximization of impact velocity
As shown by Eqs. (12) or (17), the second general possibility to increase penetration
is to augment the impact velocity. This can be done for example with a rocket-
engine fitted to the bomb, which has the advantage that the weapon could be
released by a low-flying aircraft rather than dropped from a stratospheric bomber.20
However, it is not possible to increase the impact velocity beyond the material
limit set by the condition that the penetrator has to remain intact upon impact and
during penetration, a limit that is defined by the yield (or compressive) strength
of the penetrator casing. Moreover, as will be shown below, increased velocity
also means increased maximal impact deceleration, which results in severe con-
straints on the nuclear warhead and its ancillary components. For these reasons, a
realistic design will most probably be a compromise in which the impact velocity
is increased at the same time as the effective opacity of the penetrator. However,
in order to simplify the argument, we will assume in this subsection that the pri-
mary free parameter is the impact velocity, and that everything is done to make its
increase possible.
Let us rewrite Eq. (12) in the form
D ∝ ρpL
( vp(0)√
2ρtYt
− 1
2ρt
)
, (21)
where the ‘proportional to’ symbol has been introduced in order to stress that what
we are interested in is the scaling of the penetration depth with the materials’s
properties, and where the maximum initial velocity consistent with the compressive
strength of the penetrator is approximately given by Eq. (14), i.e.,
vp,max(0) ≈
√
2Yp
ρt
. (22)
Let us consider again a concrete target, and suppose that we accept as a starting
point a 4 m-long steel penetrator similar to the GBU-28. Since it is capable of
penetrating 6 m of concrete at an impact velocity of 0.5 km/s, we ask for a five time
increase in velocity to vp(0) = 2.5 km/s in order to reach D = 30 m according
to Eq. (21). It then follows from Eq. (22) that the compressive strength of the
casing should be at least equal to 8 GPa, i.e., about three times larger than the
strongest steel alloy available, maraging steel (Mar 350) which has a yield strength
of 2.7 GPa.
20One could, alternatively, drop the bomb from an orbiting platform: a velocity of some 3 km/s
would require an initial altitude of 460 km and a fall time of five minutes. Dropping long-rod
penetrators from outer-space is a commonly discussed space weapon, see, e.g., [41, p. 70–72].
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We have therefore to consider a material different from steel for the casing
(or at least for its outer skin). If for example we take a ceramic of the type used
in tank armor [38, Table 2], we find that either boron carbide (B4C, Yp = 15.8,
E = 460 GPa, ρp = 2490) or silicon carbide (SiC, Yp = 12.1, E = 450 GPa,
ρp = 3230) could be used — provided their lower density is compensated for by
replacing some of the steel in the penetrator by tungsten or uranium in order to
keep the same effective density.
Therefore, provided the penetrator could be jacketed with a ceramic or some
other superhard and elastic material, it may survive the factor of 52 = 25 increased
impact pressure implied by a 5 times larger penetration depth. But what about the
the nuclear warhead and its ancillary components?
Let us rewrite Eq. (20) — which gives an estimate of the maximum deceleration
of a perfectly hard and rigid projectile — in terms of v2p instead of the ballistic
range, i.e.,
amax ≈
v2p
2L
. (23)
With L = 4 m and vp = 0.5 km/s, this is 31 km/s2 = 3, 200 g, a deceleration
smaller than the 15,000 g that we can assume the B61-7 can survive. However,
at a velocity vp = 2.5 km/s, the maximum deceleration becomes 80,000 g, i.e,
significantly larger than this value.
Returning to the analysis made in Sec. 4 in which we concluded that all the
major nuclear components in the B61-7 are axially symmetric and strongly held in
position, we can infer that at least all its metallic (uranium, plutonium, aluminum,
etc.) and homogeneous (beryllium, lithium-deuteride, etc.) components may be
able to survive a deceleration of possibly up to 100,000 g. On the other hand, the
high-explosives (which have a heterogeneous and fragile constitution) are known
to become brittle and to crack at sustained accelerations greater than 30,000 g [42].
This can cause significant problems such as premature ignition and non-perfectly-
symmetrical implosion.
Moreover, as is well known, the many ancillary components that are necessary
for the proper functioning of a nuclear weapon are in fact much more fragile than
its main nuclear components. These include the safety and security devices, the
neutron generators, fuzes, firing systems, high-explosive detonators, etc. It is
primarily the resistance to failure of these key components that has to be improved
to make them compatible with the increased stresses stemming from a twenty-
five-fold increase in impact stress.
At that point we see that if deeper penetration has to succeed by going to
higher impact velocities, the primary implication is that considerable progress has
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to be made in material science (i.e., to produce new superhard materials suitable
for strengthening the weapon’s casing, and new high-explosives than can sustain
greater accelerations) and in micro-electromechanical engineering (i.e., to build
stronger ancillary components). In both of these engineering domains, the current
“buzz word” is nanotechnology [43], which is a term emphasizing that improving
materials is mainly to be able to design them by controlling their structure at
the atomic or molecular level (better alloys, composite materials, and chemical
explosives); and to be able to reduce as much as possible the linear size of all
moving components because (at a given yield stress) this is the easiest way to
improve resistance to mechanical stress. Indeed, if using elementary elasticity
theory we calculate the bending of rod (fixed at one extremity) of length ℓ and
density ρ under the effect of an acceleration a one finds the relation
stress =
force
surface ≈ ρℓa < maximum stress ≈ Ys, (24)
which implies that smaller objects have a larger resistance to stress than larger
ones.
In summary, by increasing the impact velocity by a factor of five one is
reaching a number of material and engineering limits which are at the forefront of
contemporary research and development. If a compromise is made and the earth
penetrating weapon is made somewhat heavier and longer than the circa 2,000 kg
and 4 m we took as a starting point, the resulting weapon could not be much lighter
and smaller than the design considered in the previous subsection, especially if we
take into account the weight and volume of the rocket motor required to increase
impact velocity.
5.3 Active penetration by conventional means
After having considered the possibility of higher velocities and “wrapping the
weapon in some superhard new nanomaterial,” the third general possibility to
increase penetration is to use “repeated explosions to clear the path” through the
ground [8, p.33].
This possibility is based on the idea that weakening a target before impact
could increase penetration depth. In conventional weaponry this is the rationale
of “tandem” or “two-stage” warheads in which a precursor shaped-charge jet is
followed by a kinetic-energy projectile containing a high-explosive filling [44].
To evaluate the influence of a precursor hole, the best is to first assume that the
hole has been “pre-drilled,” i.e., that some target material has simply been removed
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before impact of the penetrator, but that otherwise the target material has not been
weakened. In that case the theory developed in Sec. 2 still applies, provided one
corrects the penetration given by Eq. (12) in inverse proportion to the ratio of the
area of the circle defined by the projectile radius a, and that of the annulus of outer
radius a and inner radius b, the pre-drilled hole’s radius [45],
D(a, b) =
a2 − b2
a2
D(a, b = 0). (25)
This expression has been found to be in reasonable agreement with various ex-
periments [45], which showed that it generally tends to underestimate the actual
penetration depth when b/a, the relative radius, is larger than≈ 0.3, i.e., when the
pre-drilled hole radius is not much smaller than the penetrators’s radius. Thus, as
the increased penetration given by Eq. (25) depends on the square of the relative
radius, a small pre-drilled hole has only a very small influence on penetration
depth.
It is therefore important to evaluate the influence of the target’s material weak-
ening when, for instance, the hole is made by means of a precursor shaped-charged
and the material is damaged several crater radii away from axis during penetra-
tion of the jet. This can be done by integrated experiments (provided they can
be made), by separated experiments in which the shaped charge and the kinetic
penetrator strike the target in different experiments, or by computer simulations
calibrated with data from such experiments. For example, in one such simulation
backed by experiment [44], it was found that whereas the penetration depth of a
caliber 60 mm projectile impacting a concrete target at a velocity of 0.51 km/s
is 115 cm, the same projectile striking the target pre-drilled and weakened by a
shaped charged charge jet to a depth of 60 cm will exit a 140 cm thick target with
a residual velocity of 0.23 km/s.
It is therefore possible to aid kinetic-energy penetration by means of a precursor
shaped charge, but the improvement is not dramatic. In particular, leaving aside
the complex interactions (such as slowing-down effects21) of the precursor charge
on the follow-through projectile, one may estimate that a “tandem” penetrator may
have twice the penetration capability of a kinetic-energy penetrator on its own. If
now the process is repeated and a hypothetical second shaped charge is detonated
underground (once a first shaped charge followed by a first penetrator have opened
the way to some depth) one could go further down — but at the expense of great
complexity and a very uncertain design.
Finally, if we consider a single tandem such that a shaped charge would aid the
penetration of a weapon containing a nuclear warhead like the B61-7, which has
21These effects can be weakened by spacing the shaped charge and the projectile.
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a minimum diameter of about 30 cm, the precursor hole should have a diameter
of at least 5 to 10 cm over a length of more than 5 m to have some positive effect.
This implies a very large and powerful shaped charge jet, which is very difficult
to create using conventional means, because tens (or possibly a few hundreds) of
kilograms of high-explosives may be required to form and drive such a jet.22
5.4 Active penetration by thermonuclear means
The fourth general possibility to increase penetration is to look at the contemporary
trend in nuclear weapons development, and to see whether some radically new
technology could be on the design horizon that would complete change the rules
of the game.
As a matter of fact, since many years and more so since the conclusion of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, nuclear weapons’s testing has moved into
laboratories where huge laser facilities are used to better understand the ignition
and burn of small thermonuclear explosions. The two largest such facilities are
under construction in the United States (the National Ignition facility, NIF) and in
France (the Laser Me´gajoule, LMJ). But quite powerful facilities are already or
will be soon available in Japan, England, China, Russia, Germany, etc.
The full understanding of the ignition and burn of small pellets of fusion
material (the so-call Inertial Confinement Fusion, ICF,23 route to thermonuclear
energy) will open the way to a radically new generation of nuclear weapons in
which there will be no, or very little, fissile material [46]. These “fourth-generation
nuclear weapons” (FGNW) are a great concern for nuclear proliferation because
they can potentially be built by all technologically advanced countries, including
non-nuclear-weapon States, and because they are militarily “very sweet” as they
are very powerful and politically usable — since they do not have some of the
major drawbacks of existing types of nuclear weapons: radioactive fallout and too
much yield.
For the purpose of the present paper we will assume that such fourth-generation
nuclear explosives can be built, and that such explosives with yields in the range of
1 to 1000 tons of high-explosive equivalent could become available at most a few
decades from now. We will also simplify the discussion by assuming that these
22In theory, a sufficiently powerful jet could be driven by the X-rays from a low-yield nuclear
explosion [2]. But the resulting third-generation “DEW plus EPW” tandem-warhead appears to
very difficult to develop without extensive nuclear testing, and would imply a low-altitude nuclear
detonation before penetration.
23For a recent review of ICF physics see Ref. [47], and for a recent appreciation of the progress
on NIF see Ref. [48].
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explosives can be approximated by a point source of high-energy (i.e., 14 MeV)
neutrons, even though they will most probably consist of spherical or cylindrical
devices with a radius of at least a few centimeters.
The availability of such powerful and compact sources of neutrons leads to
many military applications other than just explosives. This is because the neutrons
can be used to work on some material which can be accelerated (as by a rocket
engine) or forged and projected (as by a shaped charge) [2]. However, because
of their small size (say a diameter of 5 cm or less instead of the 15 cm of the
smallest nuclear artillery shells), fourth-generation nuclear warheads could already
take more easily advantage of a precursor chemical-explosive shaped-charge in
penetrating and defeating a bunker or buried target than current nuclear warheads.
In the context of the present problem of driving a powerful explosive deep into
the ground before detonating it, FGNW technology gives the possibility to envis-
age active earth-penetrating devices that could be both compact and lightweight.
Although the technological and engineering hurdles could be formidable, it is
essential not to be shy because the consequences can be far-reaching, and further
nuclear weapons proliferation is at stakes.
For example, one can think of a tandem weapon in which a front pure-neutron
explosive of 10 tons would create a powerful shaped charge jet, and a back pure-
neutron explosive of 100 tons would drive a package containing the main nuclear
explosive charge into the hole formed by the jet. The development of such a
complex device would require very powerful computer simulation capabilities, and
considerable interaction with reduced scale experiments at ICF facilities.24 In fact,
the development of FGNWs such as the earth-penetrating device just described
might be a far more credible justification than “stockpile stewardship” for the
enormous computer facilities made available to the nuclear weapons laboratories...
In summary, new types of nuclear explosives in which the main output of
energy is in the form high-energy neutrons may lead to entirely new solutions
to the deep earth penetration problem. However, for these solutions to become
a reality, considerable research and development is required to improve the non-
nuclear components of the penetrators as well, just like for the more conventional
approaches to increased penetration, as was seen in the previous subsections. This
implies that the RNEP program is consistent with the development of FGNWs and
their use in advanced earth penetrating weapons.
24A fundamental difference between the fission and the fusion explosive processes is that fusion
is scaleable while fission is not: fission is bound to high-yield explosions by the critical mass.
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6 Environmental and political limitations
The environmental consequencies of shallow buried nuclear explosions have been
addressed in a number of recent studies, and it has been convincingly argued that
insufficiently deep burial of an earth penetrating warhead will lead to extensive
radioactive pollution of the environment [13, 30].
For example, the minimum depth of burial required to fully contain a 1 kt
nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site is about 100 m. The implication for the
case under consideration in this paper, i.e., a penetration depth of about 30 m in
concrete or rock, or about 100 to 150 m in sand or earth, is that the nuclear yield
should be less than 1 kt if radioactive fallout is to be avoided.
Therefore, if a buried target can only be defeated by an explosive yield on
the order of the maximum that can delivered by the B61-7, i.e., 340 kt, one
cannot expect that this explosion will be contained. The use of a RNEP will
thus have the same environmental and political consequences as any atmospheric
nuclear explosion, and will not in any way be comparable to a kind of “nuclear
test explosion on enemy territory in which there would be no visible mushroom
cloud.”
Another seldom mentioned political limitation to the use of earth penetrating
nuclear weapons arises even if the explosions are fully contained. This is because
any nuclear weapon detonated below the surface of the Earth creates a radioactive
hot spot, containing the highly-radioactive fission-products, as well as the fissile
materials that have not been fissioned during the explosion — that is more than 90%
of the initial fissile-materials content of the warhead.25 This leads to numerous
problems, especially if the weapon contained plutonium. Indeed, most of the un-
fissioned plutonium left in the cavity created by an underground nuclear explosion
can later be recovered, possibly by terrorists, and reused to manufacture nuclear
weapons.26 This is the problem of “plutonium mines,” which are a major nuclear
proliferation concern in countries such as Kazakhstan [51] and Algeria, where
numerous plutonium-based nuclear explosives were detonated underground.
Consequently, earth penetrating warheads like the B61-7 use highly-enriched
uranium as fissile material, because in that case the un-fissioned U-235 cannot be
recovered after the explosion as it will be intimately mixed with the U-238 from
25In the case of an air-burst, the fission products and non-fissioned fissile materials are dispersed
over a large surface or carried away in the form of nuclear fallout.
26The possibility of recovering plutonium left-over (or intentionally bred — as well as other
actinides or isotopes) in underground nuclear explosions, has been studied during the 1960s in the
framework of the “Plowshare” program, e.g., [49]. Interest in the concept has persisted in various
forms until the present, e.g., [50].
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the non-enriched uranium components of the weapon.27 The only plutonium will
be the small amount bred by neutron capture in U-238. On the other hand, the
un-burnt fraction of the tritium used for boosting is much less a problem. First
because tritium is very volatile and easily drifts away from the point of explosion,
second because its half-life is only twelve years, and third because its radio-toxicity
is relatively small. For these reasons, in the case of FGNWs, the related problem
of “tritium mines” is potentially much less serious than the problem of “plutonium
mines.”
7 Discussion
The paper was organized to begin with a derivation, from first principles, of the
fundamental equation giving to first order the penetration depth of a rigid penetrator
into a solid material. This derivation was necessary in order to confirm that in the
parameter regime of interest to defeat well-protected underground targets there
is very little room for improvement outside the main parameters which appear
explicitly in Eq. (12). In particular, fine tuning parameters such as the shape of the
penetrator, or its surface texture, will only have second order effects on penetration
depth, at the level of 10% or less.
We have then reviewed the physical and engineering reasons which explain the
penetration depth of the main earth-penetrating nuclear weapon currently available
in the United States’s arsenal, the B61-11, and derived crude estimates in terms
of maximum sustainable decelerations of the ultimate impact-resistance of the
B61-7, the warhead enclosed in the B61-11 penetrator.
This has led us to consider four different possibilities for designing a RNEP
able to bury the B61-7 warhead 30 meters into concrete, or 100 to 150 meters into
earth. The first solution is simply to build a 8-meter-long, 360-mm-caliber, 10-
ton-heavy penetrator made out of a good tungsten alloy. This would be a “1950s
generation” style weapon, albeit fitted with a modern two-stage thermonuclear
warhead, and a GPS guidance system allowing for high precision delivery under
all weather conditions. Little sophisticated engineering development would be
required to produced the penetrator, and no change would have to be made in
the B61-7 warhead: the version carried by the B61-11 could be used without
modification.
27According to Ref. [28] the B61 primary consists of beryllium reflected plutonium. If that is
the case, any site of use of a B61-11 or future RNEP will have to be cleaned up, or else monitored
for thousands of years like all other “plutonium mines.”
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However, considering the weight and size of that first solution, we have in-
vestigated the possibility of augmenting the impact velocity by means of a rocket
engine. This immediately led to contemplate considerable engineering difficulties,
because while the major nuclear components could probably resist the increased
stresses arising from the greater impact and penetration decelerations (with the
exception of the chemical explosives which may have to be improved), many of
the more fragile ancillary non-nuclear components of the weapon would have to
be redesigned, using new materials and techniques which are not yet readily avail-
able. Moreover, even by making a compromise such that the penetrator would not
be so large and heavy as the one considered in the first possibility, fitting it with a
suitable rocket engine would not make it much less cumbersome.
We have therefore turned to the possibilities of aiding penetration by means of
a precursor shaped-charge. Here we have met again with considerable engineering
difficulties, especially since designing a shaped charge powerful enough to clear
the way to a circa 30 cm diameter penetrator containing a B61-7 warhead looks
very difficult, and this only to augment its penetration capability by possibly 50%
under the best conditions.
The last possibility we have considered is more speculative: Assuming that
radically new types of compact nuclear explosives will become available in the
next few decades (i.e., low-yield pure-fusion thermonuclear explosives derived
from ICF pellets which are extensively studied at present in many laboratories)
speculations have been made on hypothetical new designs which could provide a
technically more attractive solution than the three previous possibilities. In par-
ticular we have taken the example of an earth-penetrating weapon which would
be equipped with a powerful thermonuclear-driven precursor shaped-charge, fol-
lowed by a main charge that would be accelerated and driven into the ground by
the momentum supplied by a 100 tons thermonuclear explosion at the back of it.
The main conclusion stemming from considering this more speculative pos-
sibility is that the ancillary technological advances required in order to make it
feasible are similar to those implied by the second possibility, i.e., considerable
advances in the realms of materials science, micro-electromechanical systems’s
engineering, and nanotechnology. Since these potential advances significantly
overlap with the requirements of many other future weapons, both conventional
and nuclear, it is therefore possible that an important reason for considering an
improved version of the B61-11 is simply to develop these technologies as they
will be needed, for instance, to weaponize fourth generation nuclear explosives.
Finally, we have briefly looked at some major environmental and political
implications of the actual use of earth-penetrating nuclear weapons. Since these
aspects have been discussed at length in many recent publications — therefore
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reviving the still open debate on the arguable military utility and political roles
of nuclear weapons — we have not gone further than mentioning that even if an
underground nuclear explosion is fully contained, the site of the explosion will
in due time have to be clean-up, in order to avoid long-term contamination and
further nuclear proliferation problems if someone tries to recover the un-burnt
fissile materials remaining after the bomb’s explosion.28
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8 Appendix: The “Young/Sandia penetration equa-
tions”
A reviewer has asked why there was no explicit reference in this paper to the
“Young/Sandia penetration equations” which are widely used in the U.S. weapons
community, i.e., Ref. [54, 55] and references therein. The main reason for this was
that these equations are in fact empirical engineering formulas providing a good
estimate for target penetrability in materials for which measurements have been
made using projectiles that are typical of those in existence in U.S. arsenals —
that is, regularly updated formulas providing a simple and good fit to an expanding
data base. For these reasons the “Young/Sandia penetration equations” cannot
reliably be used outside of the range of materials, projectiles, and parameters
corresponding to this data base.
Nevertheless it is useful to compare the approximate but physically well un-
derstood formula derived in Sec. 2, i.e., Eq. (17) in the case of a typical concrete
target, to the main “Young/Sandia penetration equation,” i.e., Eq. (A-3.2) on page
A-2 of [55]. This equation can be written
D ≈ 9.63× S ×N ×
(
L
ρeff
ρFe
)0.7
(vp[km/s]− 0.0305), (26)
where for the sake of comparison the velocity is measured in km/s as in Eq. (17).
28There are also other problems with the used of RNEPs, such as the probabilistic nature of
projectile penetration [52] and assessing the actual damage made to the intended target [53].
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In this formula, the exponent of the projectile’s opacity (“weight to area ratio”
in engineering language) has evolved for 0.5 in the 1967 version to 1.0 in the
1988 version, see Ref. [55, p. 3] and Eq. (2) in Ref. [13], to finally become 0.7
in the current version, i.e., Eq. (26). However, assuming for example a “nose
performance factor” of N = 0.72 for a moderately sharp nose, and a “S-factor”
of N = 0.72 for a relatively hard concrete, we get 9.63 × S × N ≈ 5 as in
our Eq. (17). Therefore, in that case, for a projectile of length on the order of a
fraction or a few meters, Eq. (17) and Eq. (26) will given comparable estimates
for penetration depth.
It can therefore be concluded that Eqs. (17) and (26) will give comparable re-
sults for typical standard projectiles and target materials, but that the “Young/Sandia
penetration equation” (26) will typically be more accurate in these cases. However,
if one considers much larger velocities or projectile lengths, or else very untypical
materials, Eq. (17) may give more reliable estimates, especially if the goal is to
compare relative penetration performances rather than absolute penetration depth
estimates.
Finally, reference [55] and the “S-factor” are quite useful in providing first
order estimates for the typical relative penetration depths into various natural
materials such as rock, sand, clay, soil, or ice. In particular, if a moderately soft
concrete can be characterized by S ≈ 1, ice and frozen soil may be characterized
by S ≈ 4, hard soil by S ≈ 5, and soil fill (as above a buried bunker) by S ≈ 8,
etc.
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